Ashigaru: a heroically crafted shield
Digital sovereignty is under attack. In the last few months we’ve seen governments prosecute developers of privacy‑preserving software, app‑store gatekeepers impose new licensing requirements on crypto wallets, and even supposedly un‑censorable blockchains suffer attacks. The Ashigaru Open Source Project—a Tor‑only, free‑open‑source Bitcoin wallet—responds to all of these threats. Its unique distribution model and privacy‑enhancing features make it a crucial tool for anyone serious about financial freedom.
1. App‑store crackdowns highlight the need for censorship‑resistant distribution
Google Play, the largest distribution channel for Android apps, announced in mid‑2025 that wallet developers in over 15 jurisdictions must obtain licences to remain in the store. Some sources interpreted the policy as applying only to custodial wallets, while others reported that both custodial and non‑custodial wallets would be affected. Regardless of the final scope, the announcement underscores a broader trend: major tech platforms control distribution and can change policies overnight. In 2024 a similar scare erupted when Google updated its crypto‑app policy; only after public backlash did the company clarify that non‑custodial wallets were out of scope. In both cases, Google gave up trying to censor crypto self-custody, but this kind of confusion demonstrates how fragile access to self‑custodial wallets is when it depends on centralised app stores.
Ashigaru is designed to be censorship‑resistant. It releases its Android application as an APK that must be sideloaded, and the file is distributed exclusively over Tor. There are no clearnet download links; users connect to Ashigaru’s onion service via Tor, download the APK, verify the signature and install it themselves. This sideload‑only approach means that even if Google were to ban non‑custodial wallets outright, Ashigaru users would still have access because distribution does not depend on the Play Store. If this sounds interesting to you but you're unfamiliar with side-loading an APK, accessing Tor sites, or verifying an APK's signature, Ashigaru's documentation will walk you through the process. Doing this for the first time is easier than you might think and it will liberate you. You'll never depend on Google Play store again.
*NOTE: if you don't already run your own Dojo bitcoin node, you will need to in order to use Ashigaru. You can run your own using Start9, RoninDojo, or by following Ashigaru's documenatation. If those options don't work for you, you can connect to publicly available Dojos at dojobay.pw.
2. Governments are redefining “crime” to target privacy tools
The prosecution of privacy‑tool developers shows that regulators are willing to redefine law to criminalize software that protects users. On July 30 2025 the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Samourai Wallet co‑founders Keonne Rodriguez and William Lonergan Hill pleaded guilty to operating an unlicensed money‑transmitting business—even though Samourai never held or controlled user funds. Traditionally, a money transmitter is an entity that takes custody of funds and sends them on behalf of others. Prosecutors instead argued that providing Whirlpool coin‑join coordination constituted “transmitting” because it facilitated users in sending bitcoin to one another. By this redefinition, software developers of almost any self-custodial crypto wallet could be liable for end-user activity. It is not different than attempts to hold U.S. gun manufacturers responsible for criminal firearm use. Asinine? Insane? Unconstitutional and illegal? The regime doesn't care. Financial privacy threatens the regime's territory. It will defend it.
The Tornado Cash case went even further. In August 2025 a U.S. jury convicted co‑founder Roman Storm of conspiring to operate an unlicensed money‑transmitting business while deadlocking on money‑laundering and sanctions charges—even though, like Samourai, Storm never held or controlled user funds. Earlier, Bitcoin Fog operator Roman Sterlingov was sentenced to 12.5 years and ordered to forfeit nearly $400 million for running a mixing service. In these cases, courts even allowed testimony from chain-analysis companies who refused to disclose their proprietary methods. Their claims about alleged criminal flows were presented as fact to juries without any independent ability to verify the accuracy of those methods or conclusions. These rulings illustrate a pattern: legal systems reinterpret old laws and rig the system of due process to criminalize open‑source privacy tools whether developers are actual criminals or not. The regime does not care. It defends its territory via whatever means necessary.
Ashigaru’s developers have taken a different approach. They remain anonymous and, in June, the project relaunched the Whirlpool coinjoin protocol that Samourai had previously established. This allows users to break deterministic links between inputs and outputs through voluntary Zerolink coinjoins. All connections to the coinjoin coordinator occur over Tor. The new version uses an Electrum server rather than Dojo, so the team cannot access users’ master public keys. This design minimises data collection and reduces trust assumptions. It is currently only accessible via Ashigaru Terminal which can be run on MacOS, Windows, or Linux. Easy to follow instructions in Ashigaru's documentation will help you get it up and running with ease.
3. The recent 51% attack on Monero shows we need multiple privacy tools
Some argue that privacy coins like Monero eliminate the need for Bitcoin‑based privacy solutions. Recent events show otherwise. On August 12, 2025 the Qubic mining pool claimed it had gained 51% of Monero’s hashrate. The incident prompted debate among developers about whether the reorganization constituted a full 51% attack, but it demonstrated that even established privacy coins can be vulnerable to majority‑hashrate attacks. With majority control, an attacker can rewrite transaction history, perform double spends or censor transactions. Kraken responded by suspending Monero deposits, citing security concerns. The event underscores the need to diversify privacy strategies and have multiple tools at our disposal rather than relying on a single network.
Ashigaru operates on Bitcoin’s robust proof‑of‑work network and adds privacy at the application layer. It doesn’t compete with Monero but complements it. When one tool is under threat, users should be able to switch to another. Supporting a diverse ecosystem of privacy tools is essential for resilience.
Ashigaru Wallet's tools: Whirlpool, Stonewall X2, BIP‑47 PayNym and Ricochet
Ashigaru inherits Samourai’s privacy toolkit. Three of its most important features are:
| Tool | Function |
|---|---|
| Whirlpool | A Zerolink coinjoin implementation that allows users to mix their coins in liquidity pools, breaking deterministic links between inputs and outputs and providing strong on-chain privacy. |
| Stonewall X2 | A collaborative transaction with another participant that produces four outputs—change for each collaborator, the actual payment and a decoy output. By mixing inputs from two wallets and inserting decoys, Stonewall X2 makes it extremely difficult for chain-analysis heuristics to determine which input funded which output. If used, this effectively makes your spends a coinjoin. |
| BIP-47 PayNym codes | Reusable payment codes that allow users to share a handle publicly without reusing Bitcoin addresses. After an initial connection transaction, each payment generates a unique address, preventing observers from linking transactions to the same identity. |
| Ricochet | Adds several intermediary “hops” between the sender and the recipient. This creates additional distance between a withdrawal and a deposit, making it harder for exchanges or surveillance tools to trace the origin of funds. |
These tools complement Ashigaru’s Whirlpool coinjoin implementation. Stonewall X2 and Ricochet increase the time and cost required for surveillance to link transactions, while PayNym codes prevent address reuse. When combined with Tor‑only connections and an open‑source codebase, Ashigaru offers a comprehensive privacy toolbox for everyday bitcoin transactions. If you're using bitcoin, you need to be using Ashigaru.
Conclusion: sovereignty requires action
Privacy is not a crime; it is a shield that enables us to own and defend our digital territory. Yet governments and corporations are eroding that shield by redefining money‑transmission laws and controlling access to self‑custody tools. The confusion around Google Play’s wallet policies shows how easily your favourite wallet could vanish from mainstream app stores. The convictions of Samourai, Tornado Cash and Bitcoin Fog developers demonstrate that authorities will punish those who build privacy‑enhancing software. And the recent attack on Monero reminds us that no single network is immune.
The Ashigaru Project responds boldly and heroically to these challenges with an open‑source, Tor‑only, self‑custodial wallet equipped with advanced privacy tools. By choosing to build and maintain such a wallet in the current hostile climate, its anonymous developers accept immense personal risk: prosecution, financial ruin, or worse. They act without the safety of corporate shields or legal protections, relying only on anonymity and conviction. This willingness to endure such danger underscores both the necessity of their work and the courage it requires.
We should all be inspired by their efforts to enable the rest of us with an incredible set of defenses. By sideloading the APK via Tor, users avoid gatekeepers. By using Whirlpool, Stonewall X2, PayNym codes and Ricochet, they protect themselves and their funds by making financial surveillance nigh-impossible. By participating in Ashigaru’s resurrected Whirlpool, you protect your wealth, your physical safety, and the privacy of your transactions.
If you value sovereignty, you should be using these tools. Download Ashigaru via its Tor onion address, verify the signature, and start practicing private, self‑custodial Bitcoin. Privacy is our shield—wield it.